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Abstract
This paper develops a general two-period model of product line pricing with customer recog-
nition. Specically, we consider a monopolist who can sell vertically dierentiated products
over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of the product
in each period. In the second period, the monopolist can condition the price-quality oers on
the observed purchasing behavior in the rst period. In this setup, the monopolist can price
discriminate consumers not only by quality, but also by purchase history. Several interesting
results are derived. First, we fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when
there are two types of consumers, and a simple condition is given to determine whether the
monopolist will price discriminate by quality in the rst period. We compare it to the case
when there is no customer recognition or the rm is able to commit to its future actions. When
the type space is a continuum, we show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some
properties of the optimal contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of
partitional PBE.
JEL classication: D42; L11
Keywords: Price discrimination; Supermodularity; Submodularity; Behavior-Based Pricing;
Ratchet Eect; Bunching.
1 Introduction
Thanks to rapid progress in information technology, online companies, banks, airlines, and grocery
stores commonly collect individual information, track consumers' purchase histories, and use this
information to identify consumers and oer dierent prices and personalized products to them
accordingly (Taylor (2004) and Turow et al. (2005)). Amazon.com, for example, oers the same
DVDs to dierent customers at dierent prices based on their purchase histories. One customer
deleted the cookies on his computer that identied him as a regular customer, and the price of
a DVD fell from $26.24 to $22.74 (Streitfeld 2000). To ne-tune its marketing strategies, Har-
rah's Entertainment Inc., one of the top U.S. casino operators, mines data on its gamblers from
Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, 464 Arps Hall, 1945 North High Street, Columbus, OH
43210. Tel.: (614)292-5584, e-mail: sun.161@osu.edu. I am grateful to James Peck for his guidance. Also I would like
to acknowledge Jan Bouckaert, Huanxing Yang, Lixin Ye and participants at the fth International IO conference for
their helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own.
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Total Rewards cards that customers insert into slot machines before they play (Binkley (2000)).1
Through the personalization and content management software implemented in its website AA.com,
American Airlines is able to analyze customer proles and provide customized oers (Turow et al.
(2005)). Victoria's Secret mails catalogues that provide dierent discounts to dierent groups of
consumers (Weiss and Mehrotra (2001)). A recent article from the Center of Consumer Reports
shows that major travel sites adjust their fares in a very sophisticated fashion.2
In this paper, we examine \behavior-based price discrimination" (coined by Fudenberg and
Villas-Boas (2006)) by studying a dynamic price discrimination model with product design for
nondurable goods. Specically, we consider a monopolist who can sell vertically dierentiated
products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of the
product in each period. In the rst period, the monopolist oers a menu of contracts (price-quality
pairs), and consumers make their rst-period purchase decisions. In the second period, consumers
are partitioned into dierent segments based on their rst-period choices, and the monopolist is
allowed to oer dierent contracts to dierent segments. In this way, the monopolist can discrimi-
nate consumers by oering multiple qualities at dierent prices within each period or by tracking
their purchase history and oering dierent menus of contracts conditional on consumers' previous
purchase behavior. Among other questions, we ask when the monopolist will or will not price dis-
criminate consumers either by quality or purchase history and what the quality provision dynamics
looks like in equilibrium.
Several interesting results are derived in both discrete and continuous models. First we fully
characterize the optimal pricing strategy employed by the monopolist when there are two types
of consumers, then we give a simple condition to determine whether the monopolist will price
discriminate consumers by quality in the rst period. The nature of the equilibria varies with the
patience of consumers and the structure of the social surplus function. When the social surplus
function is log submodular or consumers and the rm are patient, the rm will forgo the opportunity
to price discriminate by quality and oer only one quality in the rst period.3 If the social surplus
function is log supermodular, consumers are impatient and the fraction of high types is in between,
the rm will oer the product with multiple qualities in the rst period. Moreover, the rm will
price discriminate consumers by their purchase history if the fraction of high types is high or the
social surplus function is log supermodular, the fraction of high types is in between and consumers
are impatient.
When the type space is a continuum, we show that, due to the well-known \ratchet eect",
there exists no fully separating equilibrium, even though full separation is feasible and could be
protable in the static model. Some properties of the optimal menu of contracts are derived within
the class of partitional equilibria. First, we provide an upper bound on the number of varieties of
the product in the rst period. Hence, in equilibrium the variety of the product is way below the
types of consumers. Analogous to the model with two consumer types, the rm will oer only one
quality in the rst period if the social surplus function is log submodular or the rm and consumers
are patient. Furthermore, if it is optimal for the rm to oer only one quality in the rst period, the
optimal market coverage in the rst period is smaller than that in the static model. In equilibrium
1The Total Rewards card collects gamblers' characteristics like age and gender and playing habits like how much
they spend per trip, what their favorite games are, and even how fast they pull a slot-machine lever.
2See http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/dynamic/e-commerce-investigation-dynamic-pricing.cfm
3A function f(x; y) 2 C2 is said to be log submodular if fxyf   fxfy < 0:
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there are some high-type consumers choosing to downgrade the product in the second period, a
phenomenon that has never been addressed in the literature. We show that the rst-period quality
or market coverage is not necessarily monotone with the discount factor .
Our research contributes to two strands of the literature on price discrimination: the literature
on static product line pricing and the literature on behavior-based price discrimination. This paper
is the rst study to examine monopoly pricing and product line design dynamics with customer
recognition. It diers from the models of static product line design by looking at the dynamics of
quality provision and allowing the rm to track consumers' purchase histories and oer customized
products. In this regard, we extend the general model of Anderson and Dana (2006) to a dynamic
environment. From the viewpoint of product line design, our study extends the single-product
models of behavior-based price discrimination by allowing the rm to oer multiple qualities. Fur-
thermore, our model applies to more general environments than those studied in the behavior-based
price discrimination literature.
A variety of models can be categorized to the literature on product line pricing.4 Mussa and
Rosen (1978) study the optimal product line design problem for a monopolist and obtain two impor-
tant observations. Their rst observation is that optimal quality provision is distorted downward
due to the information rent eect. Their second observation is that without a quality constraint,
it is optimal for the monopolist to oer multiple qualities under mild conditions. Stokey (1979)
asks whether a monopolist who can commit to future prices and faces a cohort of consumers with
heterogeneous tastes might price discriminate consumers by cutting the price over time. She shows
that generically the monopolist's optimal strategy is to forego the opportunity to price discrimi-
nate and commit to a xed price over time. If we treat the goods delivered at dierent dates as
the product with dierent qualities, Stokey's model of intertemporal price discrimination can be
transformed into a standard product line pricing problem. Hence, Stokey shows that, in contrast
to Mussa and Rosen (1978), it is optimal for the monopolist to oer just one quality.5
Anderson and Dana (2006) develop a general model integrating the seemingly unrelated models
of product line pricing and derive an elegant condition, called the increasing percentage dierences
condition or log supermodularity,6 to determine whether price discrimination is optimal. More
specically, they show that price discrimination by oering multiple qualities is protable if and
only if the percentage change in social surplus from product upgrades is increasing in consumers'
willingness to pay.
Behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) has attracted more attention in the literature
recently.7 Most papers restrict their analyses to the case of a single quality. Hart and Tirole (1988)
and Villas-Boas (2004) study price dynamics for a monopoly. Acquisti and Varian (2005) and Taylor
(2004) address the issue of consumer privacy. Some authors study dynamic price competition with
4The examples include Mussa and Rosen (1978), Johnson and Myatt (2003) and Villas-Boas (1998) on product
design decisions, Stokey (1979) on intertemporal price discrimination with commitment, Deneckere and McAfee (1996)
and McAfee (2006) on damaged goods, Courty and Li (2000) and Gale and Holmes (1992) on advance purchase
discounts, Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) and Varian (2001) on versioning information goods, and Anderson and
Song (2004) and Nevo and Wolfram (2002) on coupons.
5By integrating the models in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Stokey (1979) into a common framework, Salant (1989)
provides an explanation for these two inconsistent ndings.
6See Johnson and Myatt (2003) and McAfee (2006) also.
7See Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006), Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2004) for the recent developments on this
topic.
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customer recognition (Chen (1997), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Taylor (2003), and Villas-Boas
(1999)). Only a few papers examine BBPD with multiple products. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998)
study a monopoly model of upgrades and buy-backs for a durable good. Zhang (2005) explores
rms' endogenous product design in a two-period poaching model. Both models restrict their
analyses to either linear or quadratic utility functions and assume that rms can only oer one
product in the rst period. In contrast, our model allows the monopolist to oer multiple products
in either period, and the analysis applies to general utility functions with a mild condition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the model with two types
of consumers. Section 3 analyzes the situation when the type space is a continuum. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Model with Two Consumer Types
2.1 The Static Model with Exogenously Given Qualities
As a preliminary, we solve for the monopolist's optimal static (one-period) pricing strategy. Con-
sider a monopolist who can sell either or both of two products, one with exogenously given quality
q and another with exogenously given quality q: The marginal costs are c(q) and c(q) respectively.
Let p(q) denote the price of the product with quality q; where q = q or q: There are two consumer
types, H and L; and each consumer has unit demand. Let  indicate the fraction of high types
H in the population. The monopolist acts to maximize prot, and consumers act to maximize
their consumer surplus, u(q; H)   p(q) and u(q; L)   p(q) respectively. We adopt the following
standard assumption:
Assumption 1 (i) u(q; H) > u(q; L) > c(q); (ii) u(q; H) > u(q; L) > c(q) (iii) u(q; H) 
u(q; L) > u(q; H)  u(q; L); (iv) u(q; L)  u(q; L) > c(q)  c(q):
(i) and (ii) assume that the high-type consumers value the product more than the low-type
consumers. (iii) is the single-crossing property, and (iv) implies that if the monopolist were serving
only the low types, then it would choose to sell them the high quality product.
For this one-period maximization problem, the rm can choose to oer either one or two qualities
of the product to consumers. If the rm chooses to oer two qualities to consumers, then from the
single crossing property, it must sell q to the high-type consumers and q to the low-type consumers.
Moreover, the rm extracts all consumer surplus from the low-type consumers (p(q) = u(q; L));
otherwise the prot is not maximized: To avoid the deviation of the high-type consumers from
taking q; p(q) can be at most equal to u(q; L) + u(q; H)  u(q; H): Thus the highest prot from
oering two qualities is
 = [u(q; L) + u(q; H)  u(q; H)  c(q)] + (1  )[u(q; L)  c(q)]:
If the rm chooses to just oer one quality, then he will oer q; the more ecient one according
to our assumption: In this case, the rm can decide to either charge a high price to attract only
the high-type consumers to purchase or charge a lower price to cover the whole market. Selling
to high-type consumers only, the highest prot the rm can get is  = [u(q; H)   c(q)]: On the
other hand, by charging a price p(q) = u(q; L) the rm can sell to the whole market and get
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 = u(q; L)   c(q): The magnitude of  determines which of these three strategies is optimal.
Dene S(q; ) = u(q; )  c(q); the surplus from selling a product of quality q to type ; and
 =
S(q; L)  S(q; L)
S(q; H)  S(q; H) < 1
(q) =
S(q; L)
S(q; H)
< 1;
where (q) is the ratio of the low type's total surplus to the high type's total surplus, and  is
the ratio of the surplus increases from product upgrades. A straightforward comparison shows that
 > (q) if (q) > (q); and   (q) if (q)  (q): The following proposition characterizes the
monopolist's optimal static pricing strategy.
Proposition 1 In the static (one-period) model with two consumer types, the monopolist's optimal
pricing strategy is characterized as follows:
 Case 1. (q) > (q): The monopolist will oer only the high-quality product q; at the price
p = u(q; H) if   (q); and p = u(q; L) otherwise.
 Case 2. (q)  (q): In this case,   (q)  (q) and the monopolist will oer (i) only q
at p = u(q; H) if   (q); (ii) only q at p = u(q; L) if   ; and (iii) both qualities with
p(q) = u(q; L) and p(q) = u(q; L) + u(q; H)  u(q; H) if     (q):
This result is intuitive. When the fraction of high types in the population is high, it is the monop-
olist's best strategy to simply charge a high price, p = u(q; H); and sell to the high-type consumers
only. On the other hand, if the fraction of low types is high, then it is more protable to oer a low
price and cover the whole market. The rm will price discriminate consumers by oering multiple
qualities only if the so-called increasing percentage dierences condition
S(q; L) S(q; L)
S(q; H) S(q; H) 
S(q; L)
S(q; H)
or S(q; L)S(q; L) 
S(q; H)
S(q; H)
holds (Case 2). This condition says that the ratio of the high type's total
surplus to the low type's total surplus is increasing in quality or equivalently that the percentage
change in social surplus from product upgrades is increasing in the consumer type.8
2.2 Dynamic Optimization with Customer Recognition
We now study the dynamic version of the basic model. We will assume in the rest of the paper that
the rm cannot commit itself to second-period behavior. Suppose now that the rm can sell either
one or both products over two periods and that consumers have unit demand in each period. The
rm acts to maximize the discounted value of its prots using a discount factor  2 (0; 1): In the
rst period, the rm chooses the prices and qualities oered in the market, then consumers make
purchase decisions. In the second period, the rm oers prices and qualities that can be conditioned
on consumers' purchase histories. Consumer 's behavior is to maximize the discounted sum of
per-period utilities ut(q; ); where for a given period-t payment pt; ut(q; ) = u(q; ) pt: Consumers
use the same discount factor  as the monopolist.
8See Anderson and Dana (2006) for a graphical explanation.
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We solve for a PBE of this game. In the second period, after observing the purchase history
in the rst period, the rm chooses the second-period menus optimally given its beliefs about
consumer types in dierent segments. The beliefs should be consistent with the consumers' rst-
period choices. Similar to the static model, in the rst period the rm has three kinds of strategies:
oering the high-quality product to high-type consumers only (T1), oering the high-quality product
to all consumers (T2), and oering high quality to high-type consumers and low quality to low-type
consumers (T3). We notice that, by adopting strategies T1 and T3; the rm fully learns consumer
types from their purchase history. Hence, in the second period consumers are separated into two
segments, and the rm can and will oer the two segments the same product but at dierent prices.
In this case, the rm is going to oer only the high-quality product q in the second period, but
charge u(q; H) for those customers who purchased q in the rst period and u(q; L) otherwise.
Foreseeing this outcome, a high-type customer knows that he is going to get no consumer surplus
in the second period if he reveals his type in the rst period. Hence, high-type customers are willing
to reveal their types only if the monopolist compensates them for the second-period information
rent beforehand. On the other hand, strategy T2 provides no information about consumer types;
hence, in the second period the rm's maximization problem goes back to the static problem. To
determine which of these three strategies is optimal, the magnitudes of  and the discount factor
 play important roles. First, we dene two cuto points of  : 9
 = 1  u(q; H)  u(q; L)
u(q; H)  u(q; L)
c =
S(q; H)  S(q; L)
S(q; H)  S(q; L)  [S(q; H)  S(q; L)] ;
We then dene three areas on the parameter space for (; ):
R1 = f(; ) 2 (0; 1)2j  (q); or     (q) and     cg
R2 = f(; ) 2 (0; 1)2j  ; or     (q) and   cg
R3 = f(; ) 2 (0; 1)2j    (q) and   g
Also let pq1 denote the rst-period price for the product q: The next proposition characterizes
the monopolist's optimal rst-period strategy with exogenously given qualities.10
Proposition 2 In the dynamic model with two consumer types, the monopolist's optimal rst-
period strategy is characterized as follows:
 Case 1. (q) > (q): The monopolist will oer only the high-quality product q: The price
is given by pq1 = u(q; H)   [u(q; H)   u(q; L)] and only high-type consumers purchase if
  (q); and pq1 = u(q; L) and both types purchase otherwise.
 Case 2. (q)  (q): In this case,   (q)  (q) and the monopolist will oer (i) only q
at pq1 = u(q; H)  [u(q; H) u(q; L)] and only high-type consumers purchase if (; ) 2 R1;
(ii)only q at the price pq1 = u(q; L) and all consumers purchase if (; ) 2 R2; and (iii) both
9c is not necessarily between zero and one. See the appendix for more details.
10The optimal second-period strategy can be readily seen once we know the rst-period strategy.
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qualities with p
q
1 = u(q; L) and p
q
1 = u(q; H)  u(q; H) + u(q; L)  [u(q; H)  u(q; L)] if
(; ) 2 R3:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Several points deserve note here. First, if we ignore the condition for  and focus on the range
of ; we observe that the static and dynamic models have exactly the same cuto points for 
in determining the optimality among these three strategies! This coincidence, however, occurs for
dierent reasons. We should be aware that in the dynamic model without commitment, the optimal
pricing strategy is not just simply a duplicate of the static optimal pricing strategy. In the dynamic
model, strategies T1 and T3 give us full information about consumer types in the second period,
but the rm must pay an information rent to the high type in the rst period. Hence, intrinsically
the comparison between these two strategies in the dynamic model is the same as that in the static
model. Strategy T2; however, is dierent from the other two in the sense that it doesn't try to
solicit consumers to reveal their types. Hence, T2 need not pay the information rent in the rst
period, and, in contrast to T1 and T3; the second-period optimal strategy following T2 is simply
a duplicate of the optimal static pricing strategy. Therefore, the comparison between T2 and the
other two strategies in the dynamic model is dierent from the comparison in the static model.
Even though both models share the same cuto points of  in determining optimality, the contracts
are dierent.
Second, by incorporating the eect of ; we observe that in the dynamic model strategy T1 or T2
is more likely to be optimal than in the static model. In the static model, T3 is the optimal strategy
if  is in between (    (q)). If the seller-buyer relationship is dynamic and the rm is not
able to commit to its behavior in the future, then T1 or T2 could be optimal when     (q)
provided that  is not too small (i.e., consumers are not impatient).
When the increasing percentage dierences condition holds and  is in between (    (q)),
consumer patience  determines the optimality among these three strategies. If the rm wants to
separate consumers by inducing high-type consumers to take the high-quality product and low-
type consumers to take the low-quality product, then in the rst period it needs to pay high-type
consumers not only the rst-period information rent but also the second-period information rent.
When consumers are more patient, the discounted information rent is higher, and separating types
becomes more dicult. It can be shown that when  >  the information rent is too high and the
incentive constraint can never be met. Hence, strategy T3 (oering two qualities in the rst period)
is achievable only if   : If this condition holds, then by reasoning similar to that discussed in
the static model, T3 is indeed optimal. Thus the rm will oer two qualities in the rst period if and
only if the percentage change in social surplus from product upgrades is increasing in the consumer
type, the fraction of high types in the population is in between and consumers are impatient. On
the other hand, if  > ; then T3 is no longer achievable, and the rm has to decide to serve
all consumers or only high-type consumers in the rst period. If the rm serves only high-type
consumers in the rst period, then it has to pay the second-period information rent to high-type
consumers ahead of time. However, if consumers are quite patient (  c); then the discounted
information rent is too high to be worthwhile for the rm, and such a strategy, although it is still
achievable, is not protable. Hence, the rm will choose to cut the price and serve the whole market
in the rst period. On the contrary, if consumer patience is in between (    (q)), then the
rm will choose to charge a higher price and serve only high-type consumers in the rst period and
extract consumer surplus from all consumers in the second period.
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Third, behavior-based price discrimination does not occur when the fraction of high types in
the population is small or the increasing percentage dierences condition holds but consumers are
quite patient (  c). There are two rst-period strategies that allow the rm to price discriminate
consumers based on their purchase history: oer the high quality product to high-type consumers
only (T1) or oer dierent qualities to dierent consumers (T3). When the fraction of high types in
the population is small, however, either strategy sacrices too much prot from low-type consumers;
hence, neither strategy is more protable than T2: When the increasing percentage dierences
condition holds but consumers are quite patient (  c); T3 is not feasible and T1 is dominated
by T2 as explained before. Hence, the rm will forego the opportunity to discriminate consumers
according to their purchase history in these two situations.
Finally, the rm will oer two versions of the product to the market in either period if and
only if the increasing percentage dierences condition holds and consumers are impatient or quite
patient. Moreover, the rm will never oer two versions of the product in both periods. If the
increasing percentage dierences condition holds, then the rm would like to oer two qualities in
the rst period, but this strategy is not feasible when consumers are quite patient. Hence, in this
case the rm will oer the high-quality product to all consumers in the rst period and postpone
oering both qualities to the second period. If the increasing percentage dierences condition holds
and consumers are impatient, then the rm will oer both qualities in the rst period and oer
only the high-quality product in the second period.
Corollary 1 (i) If (q) > (q); then the rm will oer only one quality in the rst period. (ii)
Suppose (q)  (q); then the rst table below describes the relationship between optimal quality
provision in the rst-period and the values of  and ; and the execution of behavior-based price
discrimination is summarized in the second table.
First period optimal quality provision
       (q)   (q)
   q to all both qualities q to high
    c q to all q to high q to high
  c q to all q to all q to high
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination
       (q)   (q)
   N Y Y
    c N Y Y
  c N N Y
What if the rm is able to commit to its second-period behavior? In this case, it is easy to see
that we have the following result:
Proposition 3 In the dynamic model with commitment, the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy
is to repeat the optimal static pricing strategy in each period.
Hence, the rm nds it optimal to commit not to use the purchase history information to
price discriminate consumers, a common result in the literature on dynamic contracting without
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commitment or BBPD.11 Acquisti and Varian (2005) study behavior-based price discrimination
with only one quality and no production cost. Since there is only one quality in their model, the
rm can only do BBPD by observing if a consumer made a purchase in the rst period or not.
They ask whether a monopolist with the ability to commit can do better than oering a at price
in each period through some form of conditioning pricing and reach the same conclusion as we
obtain here.12 Here we consider a more general model in which the rm is able to oer multiple
qualities; hence, it is not surprising to see that the rm can do better in our model as it can still
extract some consumer surplus from the low types by oering a low quality product.
Since Proposition 3 applies to the situation when the rm is not able to track consumers'
purchase history as well, it can be readily seen from Propositions 2 and 3 that in most cases
being able to track purchase history benets consumers when the rm cannot commit, as the rm
with knowledge of consumer types is more likely to oer the more ecient product q and cover
more consumers in the second period. The only exception is the case when     (q) and
    c: In this case compared to the case when the rm cannot track purchase history, the
high-type consumers are hurt because they can only get the second-period information rent.
2.3 Optimal Product Line Design Dynamics
Next we extend the basic model by allowing the monopolist to choose the product quality optimally.
Suppose now the rm can choose any quality q 2 [0; 1] with the unit production cost c(q): Again,
let pq1 denote the price of the product with quality q oered by the monopolist in the rst period.
First we adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (i) uq(q; ) > 0; u(q; ) and uq(q; ) are increasing in ; (ii) Sq(1; )  0; (iii)
S(0; )  0 and S(q; ) > 0 for all  and some q 2 (0; 1); and (iv) Sqq(q; ) < 0 and uqq(q; ) is
weakly increasing in :
(i) is the single-crossing condition. (ii) assumes that the quality constraint q  1 is weakly
binding. (iii) guarantees that the rm will choose positive qualities, and (iv) is a sucient condition
for the q dened below to be unique. Dene
q = arg max
q2[0;1]
 (q) = S(q; L)  S(q; H)
I(q) = (
Sq(1; L)
Sq(1; L)
;
S(q; L)
S(q; H)
)
Anderson and Dana (2006) establish the following result for the static model:
Proposition 4 (Anderson and Dana (2006))In the static model, the monopolist's optimal strategy
is to oer (i) a single quality q = 1 at the price p = u(1; H) if   maxf(1);(q)g; (ii) a single
quality q = 1 at the price p = u(1; L) if   minf(1); Sq(1; L)Sq(1; H)g; and (iii) two qualities q = 1 and
q = q with p(q) = u(q; L) and p(1) = u(q; L) + u(1; H)  u(q; H) if  2 I(q):
11See, for example, Acquisti and Varian (2005), Laont and Tirole (1988) and Taylor (2004).
12If the rm cannot commit to its future actions, they show that in equilibrium consumers must play mixed
strategies which do not appear in our model. The reason is that in their model  = 1; and here we focus our analysis
on the case where 0 <  < 1:
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The intuition behind this result is similar to the case when qualities are exogenously given.
When the fraction of high types in the population is either high or low, the rm will just oer one
quality to the market. To the contrary, two qualities will be oered to the market if and only if two
conditions hold: the interval I(q) is not empty and  2 I(q): However, we notice that if S(q; )
is log submodular, then I(q) is empty. I(q) is never empty if S(q; ) is log supermodular: Hence,
we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2 In the static model, the rm will oer (i) only one quality if S(q; ) is log submodular,
and (ii) multiple qualities if S(q; ) is log supermodular and  2 I(q):
Recall that in the dynamic model with exogenously given qualities oering two qualities in the
rst period is not achievable when consumers are patient, i.e.,  > : This infeasibility is due to the
fact that the information rent is too high to make the high quality product appealing to the high
type. Hence, the rm is not able to price discriminate consumers by qualities in the rst period.
Now we allow the rm to choose the qualities optimally, which gives the rm more exibility to price
discriminate consumers as shown in the next proposition. To characterize the optimal rst-period
strategy in the dynamic environment, rst we dene
(q) = 1  u(q; H)  u(q; L)
u(1; H)  u(1; L)
(q) = [S(1; H)  S(q; H)]  [S(1; L)  S(q; L)]
~ =
S(1; H)  S(1; L)
(q)
;
Since (q) is decreasing in q; it has an inverse function denoted by  1(): To make the next
proposition clear, we divide the parameter space for (; ) into four regions:  = (0; 1)2 = 
1 [

2 [ 
3 [ 
4; where

1 = f(; ) 2 (0; 1)2j
  max[(1);(q)]; or (q)    min[(0); ~] and   ( 1()); or (0)    ~g

2 = f(; ) 2 (0; 1)2j
  min[(1); Sq(1; L)
Sq(1; H)
]; or   max[~; (q); (
 1())
(q)
]; or   max[~; (0)]g

3 = f(; ) 2 (0; 1)2j 2 I(q) and   (q)g

4 = f(; ) 2 (0; 1)2j(q)    min[(0); (
 1())
(q)
] and   ( 1())g:
Proposition 5 In the dynamic model with endogenous qualities, the monopolist's optimal rst-
period strategy is to oer (i) a single quality q = 1 at the price p = u(1; H)  [u(1; H)  u(1; L)]
and only high-type consumers purchase if (; ) 2 
1; (ii) a single quality q = 1 at the price
p = u(1; L) and all consumers purchase if (; ) 2 
2; (iii) both qualities q = 1 and q = q with
pq

1 = u(q
; L) and p11 = u(1; H)  u(q; H) + u(q; L)  [u(1; H)  u(1; L)] if (; ) 2 
3, (iv)
both qualities q = 1 and q =  1() with p
 1()
1 = u(
 1(); L) and p11 = u(1; H) u( 1(); H)+
u( 1(); L)  [u(1; H)  u(1; L)] if (; ) 2 
4:
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Basically this result is the same as what we obtain in the model with exogenously given qualities:
only one quality will be oered in the rst period when consumers are patient or  is either high
or low. The condition for  is slightly more complicated. If the restriction on  can be ignored;
then the rm's optimal strategy is to oer two qualities q = 1 and q = q in the rst period to
price discriminate consumers when  2 I(q). This strategy is not achievable when consumers are
patient ( > (q)), since the high type can get more surplus by pretending he is of low type. One
way to avoid this problem is to make the low quality product unattractive to the high type. To
do this, the rm can degrade the quality of the second product (q = 1 for the rst product) to
q =  1() < q. This strategy could be optimal provided that the prot sacriced from the low
type is small. In this case, the quality gap (1    1()) is increasing in consumer patience.13 On
the other hand, if consumers are patient enough, then oering two qualities in the rst period is
either unprotable or not achievable. Also it is not hard to verify that 
3 [ 
4 is empty if S(q; )
is log submodular. The following corollary summarizes these results.
Corollary 3 In the dynamic model with endogenous qualities, the monopolist will oer only one
quality in the rst period if (i) the social surplus function S(q; ) is log submodular, or (ii)  > (0),
or (iii)   (0) but  > maxf(q); ( 1())(q) g :
3 The Continuous Consumer Type Model
3.1 The Static Model
This subsection introduces the static model with endogenous qualities when the space of consumer
types is a continuum and summarizes the main results obtained by Anderson and Dana (2006).
The dynamic version of the model will be studied in the next subsection. There are two main
dierences between the discrete model and the continuous model. First, in contrast to the discrete
model in which full separation with dierent types choosing dierent qualities could be optimal for
some parameters (Proposition 4 (iii) and (iv)); we show that full separation can never be achievable
when the consumer type space is a continuum (Proposition 6). Hence, some pooling is inevitable
for almost all types when the consumer types are continuous. Second, as can be readily seen in
Proposition 4, in an equilibrium of the discrete type model consumers may upgrade the product
quality in the second period, but they never choose to downgrade. In the continuous model, on
the other hand, we show that there are some equilibria in which a positive measure of consumers
choose to downgrade the product quality in the second period (Proposition 8). The intuition for
these results will be explored further in the next subsection.
Assume that the consumers' types are distributed on [; ] with strictly positive density f()
and cumulative distribution F (): We dene a contract as a price-quality pair (p; q) that species
the quality q a consumer can get at price p: Assume q 2 [0; 1]: With a slight abuse of the notation,
we use p(q) to represent the price in the pair (p; q). Let C  R+  [0; 1] denote the menu of
13As pointed out by Jan Bouckaert,  can be thought of as the probability of repurchase, in which case our result
implies that if it is optimal for the rm to oer two qualities in the rst period, then the quality gap is higher when
the probabililty of repurchase is higher.
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contracts oered by the monopolist. Consumer  chooses a contract in C to maximize the consumer
surplus u(q; ) less the price p. u(q; ) satises u(q; ) > 0; uq(q; ) > 0; and uq(q; ) > 0 on
[0; 1]  [; ]: For a given C, dene (p(q()); q()) to be a contract that maximizes consumer 0s
utility, i.e., (p(q()); q()) 2 argmax(p;q)2C u(q; )   p: Consumer  makes a purchase if and only
if the individual rationality constraint u(q(); )   p(q())  0 is met: The rm's unit cost of
producing quality q is c(q): Again, let S(q; ) = u(q; )   c(q) denote the surplus function. Dene
() = argmaxq2[0;1] S(q; ) and  to be the point such that S((); ) = 0: The rm's problem
is to choose a menu C  R+  [0; 1] to maximize its prot
R 
l
[p(q())   c(q())]dF (); where the
cuto point l solves u(q(l); l)   p(q(l)) = 0. By invoking the direct revelation principle and
integration by parts, the rm's problem is equivalent to picking l and a nondecreasing quality
function q() : [l; ]! [0; 1] to
max
R
l
[S(q(); )  1  F ()
f()
S(q(); )]dF ():
We make the following assumption:14
Assumption 3 (i) The hazard rate 1 F ()f() is decreasing, (ii)  2 (0; 1); (iii) S(0; ) < 0 8 2 [;
]; and (iv) Sqq(q; ) < 0; Sqq(q; )  0; and Sq(q; )  0:
Condition (ii) implies that the rm will never choose to cover the whole market. (iii) implies
that the rm will never choose q = 0, and (i) and (iv) allow us to ignore the monotonicity constraint
in q and solve the problem pointwisely. Anderson and Dana establish the following result:
Proposition 6 (Anderson and Dana (2006))(i) If S(q; ) is log submodular 8(q; ) 2 (0; 1)  [;
]; then the rm's optimal strategy is to oer a single contract with q = 1: (ii) If S(q; ) is log
supermodular at (1; ) 8 2 [; ]; then the rm's optimal strategy is to oer multiple contracts.
This proposition provides an elegant condition to determine whether price discrimination through
oering multiple qualities is protable. The condition states that if the percentage change in social
surplus from product upgrades is decreasing in the consumer type, then the rm nds it optimal to
oer only one contract. On the other hand, if the percentage change in social surplus from product
upgrades is increasing in the consumer type, then the rm can increase its prot by oering multiple
qualities. Contrary to the discrete model in which the fraction of high types plays an important role
in determining the optimal strategy, log supermodularity alone is a sucient condition for oering
multiple contracts to be optimal.
3.2 The Properties of Dynamic Optimal Contracts
We now start our analysis of the two-period version of the model with customer recognition. The
timing of the game is as follows: (i) In the rst period, the rm chooses a menu of contracts
C1  R+ [0; 1]; and then each consumer makes his choice. (ii) Consumers are divided into several
14(iv) is a sucient second-order condition guaranteeing that our maximization problem is well-dened and the
optimal quality function q() is strictly increasing or equal to one. It can be replaced by the following slightly weaker
condition: Sqq   1 Ff Sqq < 0 and Sq < [ 2f1 F + f
0
f
]Sq:
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purchasing segments based on the contract they took in the rst period. The rm provides a
menu of contracts to each group. (iii) Finally, each consumer makes his second-period choice. Let
(p1(); q1()) 2 C1 denote the contract taken by consumer  in the rst period. Dene A() =
f0 2 [; ]j(p1(0); q1(0)) = (p1(); q1())g; the set of types that choose the same contract as type
 in the rst period, and N = f 2 [; ]j  does not take any contract in the rst periodg. Then
fNg [ fA()g2[;] is a partition of the type space [; ]. Let C2A  R+  [0; 1] denote the set
of contracts oered by the rm to group A in the second period and p2(jA); q2(jA)) 2 C2A the
contract taken by consumer  2 A in the second period.15 The monopolist acts to maximize the
discounted value of prots, using the common discount factor 0 <  < 1. Consumer 0s behavior
is to maximize the discounted sum of per-period utilities: To solve this problem, we use perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept. For a given C1; a continuation equilibrium is
a PBE for the subgame following C1: Next, we give a denition and prove the nonexistence of fully
separating continuation equilibria.
Denition 1 For a given C1; a continuation equilibrium with the partition fNg [ fA()g2[;] is
said to be fully separating if N = [; a] for some a 2 [; ) and A() is a singleton for all  2 (a; ]:16
Proposition 7 For any given C1; there exists no fully separating continuation equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a fully separating continuation equilibrium
with N = [; a] for some a 2 [; ): Let (p1(q1()); q1()) 2 C1 denote the contract taken by
consumer  in the rst period, where  2 (a; ]: WLOG we assume a  : Since each consumer
 2 (a; ] fully reveals his type in the rst period, the rm will extract all surplus from them in
the second period. Hence in the second period the rm will oer (u((); ); ()) to the consumer
who took (p1(q1()); q1()) in the rst period, and the value function is V () = u(q1(); )  
p1(q1())+ [u((); ) u((); )] = u(q1(); )  p1(q1()). The incentive constraint implies that
p1(q1()) and q1() are monotone increasing and hence, dierentiable a.e. Pick any 
 at which
V () is dierentiable. Then V 0() = uq(q1(); )q01() + u(q1(); )   p01(q1())q01() =
u(q1(
); ); where uq(q1(); ) p01(q1()) = 0 by the incentive constraint again. On the other
hand, applying the general envelope theorem (Theorem 2, Milgrom and Segal (2002)) gives us
V 0() = u(q1(); ) + u((); ); a contradiction. Q:E:D:
Contrary to the static model with continuous consumer types in which full separation is achiev-
able and may be protable, Proposition 7 shows that full separation is never achievable in the
dynamic contracting problem without commitment. This outcome can be explained by the well-
known "ratchet (bunching) effect."17 A high-type consumer will face an unfavorable contract
in the second period if he reveals his type in the rst period by taking a high quality product
Therefore, he is disinclined to reveal his type early in the dynamic relationship.
15Without loss of generality here we assume that the exit option is in all menus C1 and C2A: Consumers can always
choose to not take any contract:
16To avoid the issue of determining the cuto point, Laont and Tirole (1988) assume that the social utility of the
project is large enough so that it is always worth carrying out the project, meaning that N = ? in their model. Here
we always have an interior cuto point, hence the \pooling part" N is inevitable in dening fully separating.
17See Laont and Tirole (1988) and Weitzman (1980).
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To the best of our knowledge, no one has been able to characterize the whole set of incentive
contracts and solve for the optimal dynamic contracts when the type space is a continuum and
the principal cannot commit to his future actions, for there are too many possible partitions on
the type space given any rst-period menu of contracts and the revelation principle fails in dy-
namic contracting without commitment.18 Laont and Tirole (1988) encounter the same problem
when they study cost regulation in the dynamic framework, and they restrict their analysis to the
properties of continuation equilibria. Moreover, they give an example to show that there exists
a continuation equilibrium which exhibits the innite reswitching property (hence it is nonparti-
tional). As suggested by Laont and Tirole, however, it is natural for us to study the so-called
partitional continuation equilibrium.
Denition 2 A continuation equilibrium for a given C1 is said to be partitional if the number of
segments on the type space fNg [ fA()g2[;] induced by C1 is countable and each segment is
connected.
A partitional continuation equilibrium rules out the situation in which there is a contract in C1
taken by some low-type and high-type consumers, but not taken by those in between. It is actually
a dynamic version of the single crossing condition in the sense that each pair of the two-period
utility functions induced by C1 and the rm's beliefs can cross at most once. The set of all PBE
with a partitional continuation equilibrium is said to be the class of partitional PBE. According to
this denition, if a PBE with the rst-period menu C1 has a partitional continuation equilibrium,
then there can be at most countably many contracts in C1 taken by consumers. However, the
following proposition tells us that the number of feasible rst-period contracts can be substantially
trimmed in equilibrium.
Proposition 8 In a PBE with partitional continuation equilibrium, if (p1; q1) and (p2; q2) in C1
are taken by some consumers, then jq1   q2j  min2[;] u(();)uq(1;) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Within the class of partitional PBE, Proposition 8 demonstrates the extensive inuence of the
ratchet eect. The ratchet eect expresses the unwillingness of the high types to reveal their types
by taking a high quality product. A high-type consumer is inclined to take a high quality product
only if the quality dierence is suciently large so that the utility gain from taking a high quality
product is larger than the discounted information rent he can acquire by taking a low quality
product in the rst period instead. Accordingly Proposition 8 provides a lower bound for the
quality dierence taken by consumers in the rst period in equilibrium. It states that the dierence
between the two rst-period qualities in a PBE with partitional continuation equilibrium cannot
be smaller than the discount factor times some constant that is determined by the structure of the
social surplus function.19 A higher discount factor implies a higher discounted information rent;
18With the assumption that there are only nitely many types of agents, Bester and Strausz (2001) study the
optimal contracting problem for environments in which the principle cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by
the mechanism and derive a revised version of the revelation principle in the sense that each agent reports his true
type with some positive probability which is not necessary equal to one. They then reduce the original question to a
standard programming problem by applying Caratheodory's theorem.
19Recall that  is determined by S((); ) = 0:
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therefore the lower bound is greater.
uq
u
measures the percentage change in the marginal utility
with respect to  from product upgrades. A higher
uq
u
implies a higher utility gain from taking
a high quality product and consequently a smaller lower bound. In addition, since the quality
oering is bounded between 0 and 1, this proposition is equivalent to saying that in a PBE with
partitional continuation equilibrium the number of relevant rst-period contracts cannot be greater
than the inverse of this lower bound.20 Hence, we establish an upper bound for the number of
product versions oered in the rst period, which greatly simplies the procedure for searching for
the optimal dynamic contracts.
Corollary 4 In a PBE with partitional continuation equilibrium, the number of contracts taken by
consumers in the rst period cannot be greater than 1=[min2[;]
u(();)
uq(1;)
].
Proposition 7 demonstrates that some pooling must occur in equilibrium for almost all types,
but it does not tell us how much pooling is required. This corollary supplements Proposition 7 by
explicitly telling us the maximum number of rst-period contracts that can be allowed in a PBE
with partitional continuation equilibrium. With this corollary in hand and conning ourselves to
the class of partitional PBE, characterizing the optimal dynamic contracts becomes an extremely
complicated but theoretically solvable maximization problem. To see this, we rst observe that if
the rm oers a menu of n contracts in the rst period which induces a partitional continuation
equilibrium, then the segments fNg [ fA()g2[;] can be fully characterized by an increasing
sequence of cuto points figni=1 on [; ]: The optimal strategy in each segment can be specied
using standard techniques, and the optimal dynamic strategy with n rst-period contracts can be
solved by choosing figni=1 appropriately. Doing this for menus of n contracts for all n below the
upper bound, the optimal rst-period menu of contracts is the one that generates the most prot.
However, we are interested here in when the rm nds it optimal to oer only one quality in the rst
period and what this equilibrium looks like. The answers are provided in the next two propositions.
Remember that in the static model the rm's problem is to choose a cuto point l and a nonde-
creasing quality function q() : [l; ]! [0; 1] to maximize
R 
l
[S(q(); )  1 F ()f() S(q(); )]dF ():
Let l denote the optimal cuto point in the static model. To simplify the expression, we dene
() = S((); )  1  F ()
f()
S((); );
the virtual prot evaluated at type  and quality (): Our next proposition provides some inter-
esting properties of the optimal contracts over two periods when oering a single contract in the
rst period is optimal for the rm. Let 1l denote the optimal rst-period cuto point, 

N the
optimal cuto point in N; A = [1l; ] the set of consumers who purchased in the rst period; and
q1 the optimal rst-period quality.
Proposition 9 In the dynamic model, suppose that the rm's optimal strategy is to oer a single
contract in the rst period and that this contract induces a partitional continuation equilibrium.
Then we have (i) (optimal cuto points) 1l > 

l > 

N ; (ii) (quality provision dynamics) q2(

1ljA) 
q1 = q2(1ljN) = (1l); and (iii) (comparative statics) sign
@1l
@ = sign (

1l) and sign
@q1
@ = sign
(1l) 8q1 6= 1:
20Assuming the utility function is quadratic, Laont and Tirole (1988) provide a lower bound on the dierence
between the rst-period cost levels. Our result holds for any utility function satisfying assumption 3.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Three remarks are noteworthy. First, we observe that when facing a dynamic relationship and
oering a single contract in the rst period is optimal, the rm chooses to serve fewer consumers
than it does in the static setup (1l > 

l ) in the rst period: This result is not as straightforward
as it seems. A rough intuition behind this result is the following. If the rm does business with
consumers only once, then it is going to serve all consumers down to the type that gives it zero
virtual prot, i.e., l is determined by equating the social surplus to information rent. On the
other hand, in the repeated seller-buyer relationship with customer recognition, the change of 1l
aects not only the rst-period prot but also the second-period prot in segments A and N: To be
precise, the rst-period cuto point 1l plays the role of balancing the rst-period information rent
eect against the ratchet eect.21 Starting at 1l = 

l ; let us look at the eect of a change in 1l.
Increasing the cuto point from l slightly has no eect on the prot in A since the maximization
problem in A is the same as the static one and the virtual prot is zero at l : The eects on the
rst-period prot and the prot in N are intertwined and somewhat more subtle. By increasing
the cuto point from l slightly, the rm chooses to postpone serving consumer 

l to the second
period, sacricing the virtual prot at l in the rst period but recouping it in the second period.
Recognizing that the virtual prot at l is zero when the rm chooses multiple qualities optimally,
we conclude that the virtual prot at l is negative when only one quality is oered as in our case,
and, therefore, the net eect is positive. Combining this result and the fact that increasing 1l from
l slightly has no eect on the prot in A; the rm nds it optimal to serve fewer consumers in the
rst period than it does in the static relationship.
If the rm is able to commit to its future actions, then its optimal strategy is to oer twice
the optimal static menu of contracts. Thus this result tells us that without commitment the rm
chooses to cover fewer consumers in the rst period. However, we notice that more consumers are
covered in the second period as l > 

N . Therefore, it is not clear whether commitment increases
social welfare or not.
The second observation concerns the quality provision dynamics. After 1l has been chosen, q1
is simply set to maximize the social surplus at 1l; i.e., q

1 = (

1l): The standard "no distortion
at the top" property gives us q2(

1ljN) = (1l) as well. The information rent eect distorts the
quality downward; thus q2(

1ljA)  (1l): These results tell us that in the second period the rm
will oer qualities no greater than the rst-period quality q1 to those consumers who didnot make
a purchase in the rst period (low types), but may oer some qualities lower than q1 to those who
made a purchase in the rst period (high types). As such, there are some consumers choosing to
\downgrade" the product in the second period, a phenomenon that has never been addressed in
the literature.22 Obviously the ratchet eect is the reason for this outcome. Because of the ratchet
eect, pooling is unavoidable and accordingly the quality is distorted downward in the second
period. While there is no quality distortion at 1l in the rst period, we must have some people
21The information rent is dened as the gains accruing to a consumer solely from possessing payo-relevent infor-
mation. Hence, the information rent persists even when only one quality is oered in the rst period.
22This paper focuses its analysis on nondurable goods. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) study upgrades and buy-backs
for a durable good. Since they assume that only a high-quality generation arrives in the second period, there is no
possibility for consumers to downgrade the product. One possible and interesting extension of their basic model is to
allow the rm to oer not only a high-quality version, but also an inferior or damaged version in the second period.
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above 1l downgrading in the second period.
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Last but not least, we discuss the comparative statics of 1l and q

1: Roughly speaking, (

1l)
measures the rst-period loss when the rm postpones serving consumer l to the second period.
24
Positive (1l) implies a positive second-period gain from postponing serving consumer 

l as the
rst-order eect vanishes at the optimal cuto point 1l: Along with the increase of ; the discounted
second-period gain dominates the rst-period loss, resulting the favor of increasing 1l: By the same
token, a positive second-period loss is implied by a negative (1l): So if (

1l) is negative, it is
optimal for the rm to serve more customers in the rst period as  increases. On the whole, sign
@1l
@ = sign (

1l): On the other hand, the rst-period quality q

1; which is set to maximize the
social surplus at 1l; is increasing in 

1l by the single crossing property: Thus sign
@q1
@ = sign (

1l)
as well.
Intuitively a monotone relationship between 1l and  should be expected: The rm should be
willing to cover more consumers in the rst period when the future is less important to it. Since
(1l) can be either positive or negative in equilibrium, however, 

1l is not necessarily monotonically
increasing in : Although the prot in N increases as 1l increases, the prot in A decreases at the
same time. Thus the eect of 1l on the second-period prot is vague, and, as a result of this
ambiguity, the eect of  is indenite. 1l is indeed monotonically increasing in  under some
situations. First, we notice that () > 0: This implies that  = supf 2 (l ; )j()  0g < :
So () is positive for all  > ; and consequently
@1l
@ > 0 if 

1l > : On the other hand, it is not
dicult to see that () > 0 for all  2 (l ; ) when S(q; ) is log submodular: Therefore we have
the following corollary:
Corollary 5 Suppose that the rm's optimal strategy is to oer a single contract in the rst period
and that this contract induces a partitional continuation equilibrium. Let 1l denote the optimal
rst-period cuto point. Then
@1l
@ > 0 if 

1l >  or if S(q; ) is log submodular.
It thus seems natural to ask the following question: When will the rm oer a single quality in
the rst period? The following proposition provides an answer to this question.
Proposition 10 Within the class of partitional PBE, the rm's optimal strategy is to oer a single
contract in the rst period if (i) S(q; ) is log submodular or (ii)  > 1
min2[;]
u(();)
uq(1;)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Similar to the result in the model with two consumer types, the rm nds it optimal not to price
discriminate consumers through qualities in the rst period when the percentage change in social
surplus from product upgrades is decreasing in the consumer type (i.e., S(q; ) is log submodular).
On the other hand, when S(q; ) is not log submodular, oering multiple qualities in the rst
period may be protable, but it is not achievable in a partitional PBE when consumers are patient
23In the discrete model, downgrading can never happen as the equilibrium is either fully separating or pooling at
the low quality.
24By \roughly", we mean to attribute the change in the reservation price induced by the ratchet eect to the
second period. Equivalently speaking, () is the rst-order eect of the static model with the restriction that only
one quality is allowed to be oered in the market. See the proof in the Appendix.
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( > 1
min2[;]
u(();)
uq(1;)
) since in equilibrium the ratchet eect makes all consumers take the same
contract in the rst period.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies a general model of dynamic price discrimination and product line design with
customer recognition. The monopolist can discriminate consumers by oering multiple qualities at
dierent prices in each period or by tracking their purchase history and oering dierent menus of
contracts in the second period conditional on consumers' purchasing behavior in the rst period.
We show that the rm will oer only one quality in the rst period when the surplus function
is log submodular or consumers are patient, but the rst-period quality and market coverage are
not necessarily monotone in the discount factor . This is also the rst paper to point out the
phenomenon of downgrading. To fully understand the rm's dynamic strategy of quality provision,
however, work remains to be done to solve for the optimal menu of contracts. Here we only consider
the case of monopoly. It will be interesting to extend the basic model to competitive environments.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
First we calculate the prot for each strategy. Let pq1 denote the price of the product with
quality q oered by the rm in the rst period.
The prot for strategy T1: Oering high quality to the high type.
In this case, the monopolist can extract all consumer surplus in the second period by oering the
high quality product, charging u(q; H) to those customers who purchased in the rst period, and
u(q; L) to those customers who didnot make any purchase before. However, a high-type customer
may pretend he is of low type by not making any purchase in the rst period if the price pq1 is
too high. Therefore the monopolist's problem is to choose the price pq1 to maximize the discounted
prot subject to the individual rationality and incentive constraints:
(T1) = max
pq1
[pq1   c(q)] + [(u(q; H)  c(q)) + (1  )(u(q; L)  c(q))]
s:t: u(q; H)  pq1  [u(q; H)  u(q; L)]
u(q; L)  pq1  0
Therefore the monopolist will set pq1 = u(q; H)  [u(q; H)  u(q; L)] and the prot is:
(T1) = [u(q; H)  (u(q; H)  u(q; L))  c(q)] + [(u(q; H)  c(q)) + (1  )(u(q; L)  c(q))]
= [u(q; H)  c(q)] + [u(q; L)  c(q)]
= S(q; H) + S(q; L)
The prot for strategy T2: Oering high quality to both types.
In this case, the monopolist will simply charge pq1 = u(q; L) and it gains no information from
the rst-period purchasing behavior, so the second-period maximization problem is equivalent to
18
the static maximization problem. According to proposition 1, we can write down the prot for this
strategy as:
(T2) =
8>>>><>>>>:
S(q; L) + [S(q; H)] if   maxf S(q; L)S(q; H) ;
S(q; L)
S(q; H)
g
S(q; L) + S(q; L) if   minf S(q; L)S(q; H) ;
S(q; L) S(q; L)
S(q; H) S(q; H)g
S(q; L) + [(S(q; L) + S(q; H)  S(q; H))
+(1  )S(q; L)] if
S(q; L) S(q; L)
S(q; H) S(q; H)   
S(q; L)
S(q; H)
The prot for strategy T3: Oering two qualities.
Under this strategy, the monopolist learns the types of customers completely, and consequently
it extracts all consumer surplus in the second period by oering the high quality product, charging
u(q; H) to those customers who purchased q in the rst period and u(q; L) to the rest. Therefore,
the monopolist's problem is to choose the prices (pq1; p
q
1) to maximize the discounted prot subject
to the individual rationality and incentive constraints:
(T3) = max
pq1;p
q
1
[pq1   c(q)] + (1  )[p
q
1   c(q)]
+[(u(q; H)  c(q)) + (1  )(u(q; L)  c(q))]
s:t: u(q; H)  pq1  u(q; H)  p
q
1 + [u(q; H)  u(q; L)]
u(q; L)  pq1  u(q; L)  pq1
u(q; L)  pq1  0
Adding two incentive constraints, we get a necessary condition for this strategy to be feasible:
u(q; H) + u(q; L)  u(q; H) + u(q; L) + [u(q; H)  u(q; L)]
or equivalently:
  1  u(q; H)  u(q; L)
u(q; H)  u(q; L) = 

Under the condition   ; it is straightforward to solve for the maximizers:
pq1 = u(q; H)  u(q; H) + u(q; L)  [u(q; H)  u(q; L)]
p
q
1 = u(q; L)
The prot is:
(T3) = [u(q; H)  u(q; H) + u(q; L)  [u(q; H)  u(q; L)]  c(q)]
+(1  )[u(q; L)  c(q)] + [(u(q; H)  c(q)) + (1  )(u(q; L)  c(q))]
= [u(q; H)  c(q)  (u(q; H)  c(q))] + u(q; L)  c(q) + [u(q; L)  c(q)]
= [S(q; H)  S(q; H)] + S(q; L) + S(q; L)
If   maxf S(q; L)S(q; H) ;
S(q; L)
S(q; H)
g; it can be readily seen that T1 is the optimal strategy. If  
minf S(q; L)S(q; H) ;
S(q; L) S(q; L)
S(q; H) S(q; H)g; T2 is the optimal strategy. Now suppose
S(q; L) S(q; L)
S(q; H) S(q; H)   
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S(q; L)
S(q; H)
: If   ; then T3 is the optimal strategy. If  > ; then T3 is not feasible, and we need
to compare the prots from T1 and T2: The prot dierence between these two strategies is
(T1) (T2)
= S(q; H) + S(q; L)  [S(q; L) + [(S(q; L) + S(q; H)  S(q; H)) + (1  )S(q; L)]]
= (1  )[S(q; H)  S(q; L)] + [S(q; H)  S(q; L)]
Hence T1 is optimal if and only if
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  c = S(q; H)  S(q; L)
S(q; H)  S(q; L)  [S(q; H)  S(q; L)] :
Proof of Proposition 5.
Again, the rm has three strategies in the rst period: oering one quality to the high type
(T1), oering one quality to both types (T2), and oering two qualities (T3). If the rm is going
to oer just one quality, then apparently it will oer q = 1 according to Assumption 2. Mimicking
the proof of Proposition 2 and applying the result of Proposition 4, the prots from T1 and T2 can
be easily obtained as26
(T1) = S(1; H) + S(1; L)
(T2) =
8>>><>>>:
S(1; L) + [S(1; H)] if   maxf S(1; L)S(1; H) ;
S(q; L)
S(q; H)
g
S(1; L) + S(1; L) if   minf S(1; L)S(1; H) ;
Sq(1; L)
Sq(1; H)
g
S(1; L) + [(S(q
; L) + S(1; H)  S(q; H))
+(1  )S(q; L)] if
Sq(1; L)
Sq(1; H)
   S(q; L)S(q; H)
The analysis for strategy T3 is slightly more complicated. If the monopolist adopts strategy T3;
then it will oer the high quality qH = 1 from Assumption 2. Hence, the maximization problem is
to choose a low quality q 2 [0; 1) and prices (p11; pq1) that solve
(T3) = max
q;p11;p
q
1
[p11   c(1)] + (1  )[pq1   c(q)]
+[(u(1; H)  c(1)) + (1  )(u(1; L)  c(1))]
s:t: u(1; H)  p11  u(q; H)  pq1 + [u(1; H)  u(1; L)]
u(q; L)  pq1  u(1; L)  p11
u(q; L)  pq1  0
To satisfy the rst two inequalities, the following relation must hold
  (q) = 1  u(q; H)  u(q; L)
u(1; H)  u(1; L)
25Under the condition
S(q; L) S(q; L)
S(q; H ) S(q; H )   
S(q; L)
S(q; H )
; c 2 [0; 1] only if S(q; H)  S(q; L)  0: Hence T2 is the
optimal strategy directly if S(q; H) S(q; L) < 0: Moreover, c = 1 when S(q; H) = S(q; L); and c =  when
 =
(1 )S(q;L)+S(q;L)
(1 )S(q;H )+S(q; H ) :
26Recall that q = argmaxq2[0;1]  (q) = S(q; L)  S(q; H):
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We notice that (q) is monotone decreasing in q; hence, it has an inverse function denoted
by  1(): Let us temporarily ignore this condition and solve it directly. Applying the result in
Proposition 2, the prot from T3 for a given q is
[S(1; H)  S(q; H)] + S(q; L) + S(1; L);
which is maximized at q = q: However, the relation   (q) is not guaranteed to be satised.
If  > (q); then q is not feasible anymore, and the rm has to decrease the quality to meet
this condition. If  > (0); then T3 is not feasible. If   (q); the q is the optimal choice. If
(q)    (0); then the rm will choose q =  1(): In sum, the prot for T3 is
(T3) =
8<:
[S(1; H)  S(q; H)] + S(q; L) + S(1; L) if   (q)
[S(1; H)  S( 1(); H)] + S( 1(); L) + S(1; L) if (q)    (0)
not feasible if  > (0)
A straightforward comparison gives us Proposition 5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Let f(pi; qi)g be the rst-period contracts oered by the rm with qi < qi+1, and fig be the
cuto points induced by f(pi; qi)g: Obviously 1  ; for the rm cannot get any prot in either
period if 1 < : Dene Ai = [i; i+1]: For each Ai the rm chooses in the second period a cuto
point Ai 2 [i; i+1] and a nondecreasing function q( jAi) : [Ai ; i+1] ! [0; 1] to maximize
i+1R
Ai
[S(q(jAi); )  u(q(jAi); )F (i+1)  F ()
f()
]f()d:
Let fAi ; q( jAi)g denote the optimal second-period strategy inAi:We notice that q(i+1jAi) =
(i+1): The incentive constraints for i+1 and  2 [Ai ; i+1) require that
u(qi+1; i+1)  pi+1  u(qi; i+1)  pi + 
i+1R
Ai
u(q
(jAi); )d
u(qi; )  pi + 
R
Ai
u(q
(jAi); )d  u(qi+1; )  pi+1
Therefore for any  2 [Ai ; i+1)
u(qi+1; i+1)  u(qi+1; )  [u(qi; i+1)  u(qi; )]  
i+1R

u(q
(jAi); )d  0:
Dividing both sides by (i+1   ) and letting  ! i+1 gives us
u(qi+1; i+1)  u(qi; i+1)  u((i+1); i+1):
By the mean-value theorem, 9 a 2 [qi; qi+1] such that
uq(a; i+1)(qi+1   qi) = u(qi+1; i+1)  u(qi; i+1)  u((i+1); i+1):
21
Hence27
qi+1   qi  u((i+1); i+1)
uq(a; i+1)
 u((i+1); i+1)
uq(1; i+1)
  min
2[;]
u((); )
uq(1; )
:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9.
Let (p1; q1) be the rst-period contract oered by the rm and 1l be the rst-period cuto
point induced by (p1; q1). Dene A = [1l; ] and N = [; 1l]: In the second period, the rm can
oer dierent menus of contracts in A and N: Let Al be the cuto point in A; Nl the cuto point
in N; q2( jA) : [Al; ] ! [0; 1] a nondecreasing quality oering in A; and q2( jN) : [Nl; ] ! [0; 1]
a nondecreasing quality oering in N: Then the rm's prot function is
 = [1  F (1l)][p1   c(q1)] + f
R
Al
[u(q2(jA); )  c(q2(jA))  u(q2(jA); )1  F ()
f()
]f()d
+
1lR
Nl
[u(q2(jN); )  c(q2(jN))  u(q2(jN); )F (1l)  F ()
f()
]f()dg
= [1  F (1l)][p1   c(q1)] + f
R
Al
[S(q2(jA); )  u(q2(jA); )1  F ()
f()
]f()d
+
1lR
Nl
[S(q2(jN); )  u(q2(jN); )F (1l)  F ()
f()
]f()dg
To solve this problem, let us determine the rst-period price p1. Consider consumer 
0
1ls be-
havior. In the rst period, 1l can choose to be the lowest type in A and gain no surplus in the
second period, or the highest type in N and acquire some information rent. To satisfy the incentive
constraint, p1 should be set to make 1l indierent between these two alternatives. By taking the
contract (p1; q1); consumer 
0
1ls utility is u(q1; 1l) p1: If he rejects the contract, then his utility will
be 
R 1l
Nl
u(q2(jN); )d by the envelope theorem. Hence in equilibrium it must be the case that
u(q1; 1l)   p1 = 
R 1l
Nl
u(q2(jN); )d; or equivalently p1 = u(q1; 1l)   
R 1l
Nl
u(q2(jN); )d:
Then the prot function can be rewritten as
 = [1  F (1l)][u(q1; 1l)  c(q1)  
1lR
Nl
u(q2(jN); )d]
+f
R
Al
[S(q2(jA); )  u(q2(jA); )1  F ()
f()
]f()d
+
1lR
Nl
[S(q2(jN); )  u(q2(jN); )F (1l)  F ()
f()
]f()dg
The optimal choice of q1 must solve maxq12[0;1] u(q1; 1l) c(q1): Hence q1 = (1l): On the other
hand, we notice that the optimal choice of q2(1ljN) is (1l) as well: Furthermore, we also need to
27Recall that Sqq(q; )  0:
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check the incentive compatibility for any  2 A and  2 N: Given that q1 = q2(1ljN) = (1l); it
is straightforward to verify that this is indeed the case.
For a given 1l; let fAl; Nl; q2( jA); q2( jN)g denote the optimal second-period strategy. To
determine the optimal value of 1l; we analyze the rst-order condition for 1l:
28 We claim that
1l > 

l by showing that
@
@1l
> 0 8  l :29 There are two cases to be considered: Al = 1l and
Al > 1l:
Case 1. Al > 1l: Using the envelope theorem,
@
@1l
in this case is :
@
@1l
=  f(1l)[S(q1; 1l)  
1lR
Nl
u(q

2(jN); )d] + [1  F (1l)][u(q1; 1l)
  @
@1l

1lR
Nl
u(q

2(jN); )d] + [S(q2(1ljN); 1l)f(1l) 
1lR
Nl
u(q

2(jN); )df(1l)]
= [(1  F (1l))u(q1; 1l)  f(1l)S(q1; 1l)]
+[S(q2(1ljN); 1l)f(1l)  (1  F (1l))
@
@1l
1lR
Nl
u(q

2(jN); )d]
= [(1  F (1l))u(q1; 1l)  f(1l)S(q1; 1l)] + [S(q2(1ljN); 1l)f(1l)  (1  F (1l))u(q2(1ljN); 1l)]
 (1  F (1l))[
1lR
Nl
@
@1l
u(q

2(jN); )d   u(q2(NljN); Nl)
@Nl
@1l
]
=  (1  )f(1l)[S((1l); 1l)  1  F (1l)
f(1l)
u((1l); 1l)]
 (1  F (1l))[
1lR
Nl
@
@1l
u(q

2(jN); )d   u(q2(NljN); Nl)
@Nl
@1l
]
Fact 1. @@1lu(q

2(jN); )  0 and @

Nl
@1l
> 0: Invoking the envelope theorem on the second-
period value function for some  on N;
	(1l; ) = max
q2(jN)2[0;1]
(q2(jN)) = S(q2(jN); )  u(q2(jN); )F (1l)  F ()
f()
;
we get @@1l	(1l; ) =  u(q2(jN); )f(1l)=f() < 0; hence, Nl is increasing in 1l: q2(jN) solves
the rst order condition q = 0 (or q > 0 if q

2(jN) = 1): Applying the implicit function theorem,
we can get @@1l q

2(jN)  0: Thus
@
@1l
u(q

2(jN); ) = uq(q2(jN); )
@
@1l
q2(jN)  0:
Fact 2. If 1l  l ; then we have
S((1l); 1l)  1  F (1l)
f(1l)
u((1l); 1l)  0;
28Here we simply assume that the second- order condition is satised.
29Recall that l is the optimal cuto point in the static model.
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for S(q; l ) 
1 F (l )
f(l )
u(q; 

l ) 8q 2 [0; 1] is zero at most and 1l  l .
Combining these two facts, we conclude that @@1l > 0 when 1l  l : Hence, the optimal choice
1l 2 (l ; ) in this case:
Case 2. Now suppose Al = 1l: Then
@
@1l
has one more term:
 [S(q2(1ljA); 1l)  u(q2(1ljA); 1l)1  F (1l)
f(1l)
]f(1l);
which is non-negative when 1l  l : Therefore, the optimal choice 1l 2 (l ; ):
Next we study the comparative statics. Since 1l 2 (l ; ); it is sucient for us to analyze @@1l
for 1l 2 (l ; ): In this range, Al = 1l; and @@1l can be expressed as
@
@1l
=  f(1l)(1l)+(1l);
where
(1l) = S((1l); 1l) 
1  F (1l)
f(1l)
u((1l); 1l)
(1l) = f(1l)[(1l)  [S(q2(1ljA); 1l)  u(q2(1ljA); 1l)
1  F (1l)
f(1l)
]]
 (1  F (1l))[
1lR
Nl
@
@1l
u(q

2(jN); )d   u(q2(NljN); Nl)
@Nl
@1l
]
Therefore we have @
2
@1l@
= (1l): If (

1l) > 0; then  is (locally) supermodular at (; 

1l);
which implies that the optimal rst-period cuto point 1l is increasing in : Similarly, if (

1l) < 0;
then 1l is decreasing in : So we have sign
@1l
@ = sign (

1l): The rst-order condition
@
@1l
j1l=1l =
0 implies that sign (1l) = sign (

1l): Thus we have sign
@1l
@ = sign (

1l): On the other hand,
we observe that S(q; ) is supermodular on (q; ) by the single crossing property: Hence the optimal
rst-period quality q1 = (); which maximizes the social surplus at ; is increasing in : Therefore
sign
@q1
@ = sign
@1l
@ : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10.
Case 1. When  is high. This is a direct consequence of proposition 8 and the fact that q 2 [0; 1]:
Case 2. When S(q; ) is log submodular. First, we show that any two-contract strategy is
strictly dominated by a single-contract strategy when S(q; ) is log submodular. To make the
analysis clear, we divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1. Write down the prot function. Let C1 = f(pi; qi)g2i=1 be any two-contract strategy
with q1 < q2; and fig2i=1 with 1 < 2 the cuto points induced by C1: Dene Ai = [i; i+1] (let
3 = ) and N = [; 1]: Let fAi ; q( jAi)g denote the optimal strategy in Ai; and fN ; q( jN)g
the optimal strategy in N: As explained in the proof of proposition 9, (p1; p2) must satisfy the
following equations:
u(q1; 1)  p1 = 
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d
u(q2; 2)  p2 = u(q1; 2)  p1 + 
2R
A1
u(q
(jA1); )d
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Thus the prot function can be written as:
 = [1  F (2)][u(q2; 2)  u(q1; 2) + u(q1; 1)  
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d   
2R
A1
u(q
(jA1); )d   c(q2)]
+[F (2)  F (1)][u(q1; 1)  
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d   c(q1)]
+f
R
A2
[S(q(jA2); )  u(q(jA2); )1  F ()
f()
]f()d
+
2R
A1
[S(q(jA1); )  u(q(jA1); )F (2)  F ()
f()
]f()d
+
1R
N
[S(q(jN); )  u(q(jN); )F (1)  F ()
f()
]f()dg
Step 2. We claim that 1 > 

l : There are two cases to be considered: 

A1
= 1 and 

A1
> 1:
First, let us assume Al > 1l: Using the envelope theorem, the rst order condition w.r.t. 1 in
this case is :
@
@1
= [1  F (2)][u(q1; 1)   @
@1
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d]
 f(1)[u(q1; 1)  
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d   c(q1)]
+[F (2)  F (1)][u(q1; 1)   @
@1
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d]
+[S(q(1jN); 1)f(1)  f(1)
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d]
= [1  F (1)][u(q1; 1)   @
@1
1R
N
u(q
(jN); )d]  f(1)S(q1; 1) + S(q(1jN); 1)f(1)
= [(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)] + [f(1)S(q(1jN); 1)  (1  F (1))u(q(1jN); 1)]
 (1  F (1))[
1R
N
@
@1
u(q
(jN); )d   u(q(N jN); N )
@N
@1
]
Fact 1.
R 1
N
@
@1
u(q
(jN); )d   u(q(N jN); N )@

N
@1
< 0; as demonstrated in the proof of
proposition 9.
Fact 2. q(1jN) = 1; since S(q; ) is log submodular.
Fact 3.   u(q1;1)u(q(1jN);1) from the incentive constraint.
Fact 4. f(1)S(q
(1jN); 1)   (1   F (1))u(q(1jN); 1)  0 if 1  l ; since S(q; l )  
1 F (l )
f(l )
u(q; 

l ) is zero at most and 1  l :
Fact 5. (1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)  0 if 1  l ; since S(q; l ) 
1 F (l )
f(l )
u(q; 

l ) is
zero at most and 1  l :
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Fact 6. We show that if 1  l ; then
[(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)] + [f(1)S(q(1jN); 1)  (1  F (1))u(q(1jN); 1)] > 0:
From Facts 2-5, we can get
[(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)] + [f(1)S(q(1jN); 1)  (1  F (1))u(q(1jN); 1)]
= [(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)] + [f(1)S(1; 1)  (1  F (1))u(1; 1)]
 [(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)] + u(q1; 1)
u(1; 1)
[f(1)S(1; 1)  (1  F (1))u(1; 1)]
=
f(1)
u(1; 1)
[u(q1; 1)S(1; 1)  u(1; 1)S(q1; 1)]
=
f(1)S(1; 1)S(q1; 1)
u(1; 1)
[
u(q1; 1)
S(q1; 1)
  u(1; 1)
S(1; 1)
] > 0:
The last inequality comes from the log submodularity of S(q; ):
Combining Facts 1 and 6, we conclude that @@1 > 0 for any 1  l : Hence the optimal choice
of 1 is strictly greater than 

l :
Now consider the second case A1 = 1: In this case, the change of 1 has two additional eects.
The rst order condition w.r.t. 1 becomes:
@
@1
= [(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)] + [f(1)S(q(1jN); 1)  (1  F (1))u(q(1jN); 1)]
+(1  F (2))u(q(1jA1); 1)  [f(1)S(q(1jA1); 1)  (F (2)  F (1))u(q(1jA1); 1)]
 (1  F (1))[
1R
N
@
@1
u(q
(jN); )d   u(q(N jN); N )
@N
@1
]
= [(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)] + [f(1)S(q(1jN); 1)  (1  F (1))u(q(1jN); 1)]
 [f(1)S(q(1jA1); 1)  (1  F (1))u(q(1jA1); 1)]
 (1  F (1))[
1R
N
@
@1
u(q
(jN); )d   u(q(N jN); N )
@N
@1
]
The log submodularity of S(q; ) implies that q(1jA1) = q(1jN) = 1; therefore
@
@1
= [(1  F (1))u(q1; 1)  f(1)S(q1; 1)]
 (1  F (1))[
1R
N
@
@1
u(q
(jN); )d   u(q(N jN); N )
@N
@1
]:
As shown in the rst case, this term is positive if 1  l : Hence 1 > l :
Step 3. We show that any two-contract strategy is dominated by a one-contract strategy. From
step 2, we know that 1 > 

l : It is then easy to see that 

A2
= 2 and 

A1
= 1: We also know that
q(jN) = q(jA1) = q(jA2) = 1; hence, the prot of this two-contract strategy is
 = [1  F (2)][u(q2; 2)  u(q1; 2) + u(q1; 1)  
2R
N
u(1; )d   c(q2)]
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+[F (2)  F (1)][S(q1; 1)  
1R
N
u(1; )d] + f
R
1
S(1; )f()d  
R
2
u(1; )(1  F ())d
 
2R
1
u(1; )(F (2)  F ())d +
1R
N
[S(1; )  u(1; )F (1)  F ()
f()
]f()dg
Now if we just oer one quality q2 and set the cuto point at 1, then the prot is:
e = (1  F (1))[u(q2; 1)   1R
N
u(1; )d   c(q2)]
+f
R
1
[S(1; )  u(1; )1  F ()
f()
]f()d +
1R
N
[S(1; )  u(1; )F (1)  F ()
f()
]f()dg
After rearranging terms, the dierence is:
e  = [1  F (2)]S(q1; 2)  [1  F (1)]S(q1; 1) + [1  F (1)]S(q2; 1)  [1  F (2)]S(q2; 2)
= [1  F (1)]
q2R
q1
Sq(q; 1)dq   [1  F (2)]
q2R
q1
Sq(q; 2)dq
=
q2R
q1
2R
1
[Sq(q; )f()  (1  F ())Sq(q; )]ddq > 0
by the log submodularity of S(q; ): Therefore the rm will not oer two contracts in the rst
period.
The N-contract case has a recursive structure, and we can duplicate the procedure of the proof
above to show that there is a (N-1)-contract that dominates this N-contract strategy. Repeating
this argument, we conclude that the rm's optimal strategy is to oer a single contract in the rst
period. Q.E.D.
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